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The Ties that Divide. A Network Analysis  
of the International Monetary System* 
This paper provides a new methodology to map international monetary 
relations in the 19th century. We identify an index of international liquidity and, 
applying techniques borrowed from formal network analysis (in particular, 
block-modelling) we produce a formal ranking of currencies according to their 
degree of international circulation. The resulting indices are powerful tools to 
study the logic of the emergence of international currencies, as well as useful 
controls for cross-section regressions. 
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The ties that divide. 
A network analysis of the international monetary system, 1890-1910. 
 
 
Conventional studies of the late 19th century international monetary system refer 
heuristical ly to “core” and “peripheral” countries. In this article, we seek to provide rigorous 
foundations to such expressions. Applying a formal procedure borrowed from network analysis 
produces indices of centrali ty and systematic rankings. We show that the international 
monetary system of the late 19th century is best described as a three-tier system. Other 
findings include the discovery of a closely knitted European foreign exchange system, a 
complete lack of foreign exchange linkages within Latin America, emerging intra-Asian 
relations, and a fairly late ascendancy of the US dollar. 
 
The international monetary system is not like Robert Lucas’s archipelago of even island-
economies. A more apt metaphor would be to compare it to Orwell’s Animal farm, where 
some individuals are “more equal than others”. To use the words of political scientist Jerry 
Cohen, there is a “geography of money”, and this geography is characterized by a highly 
hierarchical order cascading down from “top” currencies to “pseudo-currencies” at the 
bottom of what he describes as a “currency pyramid”.1 In the language of monetary 
historians, this hierarchy is referred to in terms of “core vs. periphery”. For instance, 
conventional descriptions of the late 19th century international monetary system contrast the 
North Western European “core” countries and the “peripheral” ones of South Eastern 
Europe, Asia, and Latin America.2 
Yet we do not know what we mean by “core” and “periphery”. This is because nobody 
cares to discuss relevant criterions. Like the blind man with the elephant, we are limited to 
knowledge of some parts of the beast. If asked to place late 19th century Britain and 
                                                       
1 Cohen, Future, Chapter 1. 
2 Eichengreen and Flandreau, Gold standard. 
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Argentina in the “core” or “periphery”, most economic historians would likely concur that 
Britain was in the core, and Argentina in the periphery. But if the same question is asked 
about Portugal, Sweden, Japan, the Netherlands, Canada, Russia, Austria-Hungary, Italy, 
Chile, or the United States of America, we should expect disagreement. 
This may not matter: “core” and “periphery” may just be heuristic concepts, better used 
rhetorically than theoretically, meaning “not everybody is alike”. But authors using this 
language usually do so in reference to some specific issue. People dealing with development 
put rich countries in the core and poor ones in the periphery. People dealing with financial 
crises put crisis proof countries in the core, and crisis prone countries in the periphery. 
People dealing with monetary policy put credible countries in the core and non-credible 
countries in the periphery. Then of course, talking of core and periphery is tautological. 
In practice, testing propositions about different macroeconomic behaviours in groups of 
countries requires agreed upon groupings. In this paper we provide a formal procedure to 
identify country groups in the late 19th century. Our approach is related to the recent 
research of international macroeconomists such as Barry Eichengreen and Ricardo Hausmann 
who emphasize the cross-section heterogeneity of financial vulnerability in modern 
economies. It is also consistent with the early work of Alec Ford on the operation of the 19th 
century international monetary system.3 Our basic intuition is that systematic differences of 
macroeconomic behavior can be traced to differences of monetary structures: national 
currencies vary in terms of their international circulation, so that countries face varied 
external adjustment constraints. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section I provides a criterion to identify the core and 
the periphery of the international monetary system. Section II shows how this criterion can be 
translated into a matrix of bilateral exchange relations. Section III uses network statistics to 
describe this matrix. Section IV relies on so-called “block-modeling” techniques to construct 
                                                       
3 Eichengreen and Hausmann, Other people’s money; Ford, Gold Standard. 
 4 
a simplified picture of international monetary relations in the late 19th century. We conclude 
with directions for future research. 
 
Missing markets matter: core, periphery, and the adjustment mechanism. 
Our purpose is not to review the substantial literature that has used the concepts of 
“core” and “periphery.” This notion, for all its vagueness, has been used by Neo-classical 
and Marxists authors alike, suggesting that appeal has not been tarnished by imprecision. In 
broad terms, we understand that people thinking in such terms believe that structures do 
matter. 
To talk rigorously of core vs. periphery, one has to address three related and difficult 
questions, in the following order: (a) Can we map the geography in the international 
monetary system? (b) Can we explain it? (c) And does it matter? This paper deals solely 
with the first question, in the context of the late 19th century international monetary system. 
The starting point is the classic discussion of the adjustment mechanism in a two-country 
world. Following David Hume and David Ricardo, the Cunliffe Committee’s First Interim 
Report of 1918 emphasized the role of monetary policy in restoring external balance.4 
Consider a two country world. Monetary authorities in country A may respond to rising 
trade deficits caused by domestic price increases by raising the interest rate. This policy 
encourages moderation in A and brings A prices in line with B prices. It also has the short 
run effect to help finance A’s deficit by attracting capital from B. 
Suppose now that we change the setting in one critical dimension: the two countries differ 
in the international status of their currency. Investors of country B do not hold balances (time 
deposits, short term credits, long term debt, and their likes) denominated in currency A. By 
contrast, residents of both countries hold assets denominated in currency B. As a result, a 
                                                       
4 Hume, Balance of Trade; Ricardo, Principles. On the First Interim Report, see Eichengreen and 
Flandreau, Gold standard. 
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rise in the interest rate by the central bank of country B will induce both residents and 
foreigners to increase their holdings of currency B. But a similar move by the monetary 
authorities of country A will have no effect on foreigners and can only work through the 
repatriation of foreign balances by residents of country A: And thus the asymmetry in 
external adjustment. 
The structural ingredient we have considered is also a prominent feature of the pre-1914 
international monetary system. A stands for Argentina, B for Britain and, as monetary 
historians know, there was no peso market in London. By contrast, in the returns of the 
Buenos Aires stock exchange we find plenty of evidence of a large and liquid market for 
sterling. A key theme of Alec Ford’s classic book on the pre-1914 gold standard is that the 
international adjustment mechanism did work differently in different countries.5 Ford 
emphasized that external adjustment was easier in the “center” (Britain) and more difficult 
in the “periphery” (Argentina.)6 We have just argued that there were good reasons for that. 
Who’s Quoting Whom?  
In this section we document the international status of the various currencies in the late 
19th century. As noted long ago by Peter Lindert, this cannot be done by computing aggregate 
statistics of private foreign holdings: such data are lost.7 We suggest taking an indirect route. 
We use individual countries’ “Course of exchange” bulletins to collect information on the 
availability of every single currency in every single foreign exchange market. 
                                                       
5 Ford, Gold standard. See also Eichengreen, “Gold Standard”. Similar issues are today at the 
heart of discussions of the US current account “problem”. Those who argue, as Dooley, Folkerts-
Landau and Garber, “Bretton Woods”, that these disequil ibria are not a concern emphasize the 
unique position of the US dollar at the “core” of the international monetary system. 
6 Ford provided a different diagnosis however, emphasizing the role of terms of trade shocks. 
7 One is reminded of Bloomfield, Capital movements; and Lindert, Key currencies. For a recent 
discussion, see Flandreau and Gall ice, “Paribas”. 
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The “Course of exchange” as a primary source 
The late 19th century saw the apogee of a foreign exchange system that had developed 
towards the end of the Middle Ages: international trade transactions were achieved through 
the use of “bills of exchange”. These were essentially negotiable bank overdrafts. They were 
issued to finance trade between distant places. Shipping commodities between two centers 
entailed a waiting period between the time when the exporter sent the goods and the time 
cash rolled in. Bankers enabled importers to draw on them a “bill of exchange” in order to 
settle purchases. Such bills could then be traded: Genoa holders of, say, bills payable in 
Barcelona, could sell them to Genoa debtors of Barcelona. The local existence of a supply 
and demand for bills payable in a foreign center created foreign exchange markets.8 
The movement accelerated in the late Middle Ages. As argued by Raymond de Roover, in 
most banking places the merchant bankers had a meeting place where they congregated each 
working day at an appointed hour to negotiate bills and set the exchange rate.9 Gradually, 
information on foreign exchanges quotations began to be recorded and circulated. As 
detailed by John McCusker and Cora Gravesteijn, the number of mercantile and financial 
journals increased during the early modern period.10 In London, “The Course of exchange”, 
became an established institution in the late 17th century.11 
By the late 19th century, virtually all countries had publications where foreign exchange 
quotes were recorded: in some cases foreign exchange transactions were recorded in official 
                                                       
8 According to de Roover, L’évolution, the development of international money markets (i.e. 
foreign exchange markets) was a device to circumvent usury laws and, as a result, predated the 
development of domestic money markets. 
9 De Roover, L’évolution, p. 27. 
10 McCusker and Gavesteijn, Beginnings. See also McCusker, Money and exchange, and Neal 
‘Financial Press’. 
11 The “Course of Exchange” was the primary source for Larry Neal’s path-breaking Rise. 
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Stock Exchange listings. In other cases, they were reported in semi-official leaflets, and then 
reproduced in the main local business and finance newspapers. 
*** Insert Figure 1 about here. *** 
Figure 1 presents London’s “Course of exchange” table as it is given in The Economist, a 
British business and finance newspaper, on the second week of 1880.12 The table comprises 
two parts. The upper part recorded the official quote in London, in other words the prices 
for the two trading days of the Stock Exchange that intermediaries communicated to the 
journal. This was the London Course of exchange properly speaking, meant to reflect faithfully 
the situation in the London foreign exchange market. The lower part was unofficial in nature: 
it was established by The Economist for the benefit of its readers, and made no claim to 
exhaustiveness or accuracy. It recorded from various sources the last known exchange rate 
quote on London as it was set in a number of foreign financial centers. For some centres the 
information could be up-to-date (e.g. from the same day in the case of New York, suggesting 
that the NY price of sterling bills was cabled to London), but quite old for others (four weeks 
for Buenos Aires).13 For some centers, there was no information, and there were also centers 
that were simply just not included in the list. 
Except for a notable chapter by Oskar Schwarzer and collaborators, previous researchers 
have not paid attention to these structural aspects of the exchange rate tables.14 Yet their 
inspection reveals intriguing asymmetries. Some foreign centers, such as Paris, are listed in 
both parts of the table. But others, such as Buenos Aires, are listed in the bottom part only. 
This illustrates our earlier point that in London agents held no peso balances. 
                                                       
12 The Economist, first published in 1844, established itself as a source for quotations in the London 
market, replacing former publications by foreign exchange brokers such as Castaing and Wetenhall . 
During the 1850s and early 1860s there was a competition between the numbers provided by 
Wetenhall and those of The Economist (see Flandreau, Glitter). 
13 See column “last date”. 
14 Schwarzer, Denzel, and Zellfelder, “Das System.” 
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Of course, similar information exists for every single market. Therefore, by going to 
individual countries’ listings and systematically collecting information as to whether each 
given center was quoted or not in other centers, one can construct “network matrices” that 
document global monetary relations. Let’s call 
t
X  the matrix of foreign exchange relations at 
date t. This matrix has dimension nxn (where n is the number of countries in the world), and 
comprises elements ijx  (i≠j), where 1=ijx  if currency j is listed by country i, and 0=ijx  
otherwise. Consider for instance the mini world comprising  Argentina, Britain and France. 
Each row presents information from the listings in Buenos Aires, London, and Paris, 
respectively. A country quoting its own currency not making any sense, diagonal elements are 
“ ! ”. Since in 1900 Paris quotes London, London quotes Paris and Buenos Aires quotes 
Paris and London, we get the following matrix whose asymmetry reflects that of 
international monetary relations: 
!
!
!
"
#
$
$
$
%
&
'
'
'
=
10
10
11
1900
X  
“Quoted” means “liquid”: a detour via Lisbon 
Modern studies of liquidity in foreign exchange markets rely on a measure known as the 
“bid-ask spread”. This spread measures the distance between the buying and selling prices 
in a dealers’ market.15 A narrow market has few dealers. This reduces competitive pressure 
and leads to a broadening of spreads. Such an “ideal” measure is not available for the late 
19th century, except for a few instances.16 But the network matrices described above provide 
                                                       
15 See Hartmann, Currency competition. 
16 The quotes of The Economist, however, must have been an example of bid-ask spreads, since 
“money” prices were the bid prices, the prices at which people were wil l ing to buy foreign exchange 
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a proxy for liquidity: evidence of active trade reveals the existence of a sufficiently large 
demand and supply to warrant the posting of prices. Our dummy variable quoted/not 
quoted is therefore essentially an index of the bid-ask spread, and thus a measure of 
liquidity. 
We got a strong sense of this while examining the data. For any given market the precise 
list of foreign currencies changed over time: some currencies were dropped, others were 
added. The disappearance of a given currency from the “Course of exchange” listings usually 
followed a period when reported quotes had become occasional, suggesting a fading 
market.17 Such was the case, for instance, of the Brazilian currency, quoted in London in the 
1840s, 1850s and 1860s, and which disappeared afterwards. Conversely, the emergence of a 
new currency in the list generally followed a period for which we found occasional references 
outside the “Course of exchange” (i.e. in the press or in contemporary handbooks) to the 
availability of the said currency.18 In sum, the existence of an active quote for a given 
currency is a reliable indicator of the existence of a liquid underlying market. 
This can be proven using evidence from the Lisbon foreign exchange market. In the Crédit 
lyonnais archives we found information on the buying and selling prices for foreign bills as 
                                                                                                                                                                          
and offering local money, while “paper” was the price at which people were offering to sell the 
bil ls. Another example is Vienna, which recorded “Geld” (money) and “Waare” (paper) prices. 
17 Alternatively, posted prices didn’t change, while a l l  other rates were moving. This is a sure 
indication that no transactions were taking place: market authorities were just copying the latest 
available transaction on and on. 
18 In 1900, the l ist given by The Economist does not include the US Dollar. A foreign exchange 
handbook for the same year mentions the dollar, but adds: “This rate is only rarely quoted as the 
London rate in New York is almost always the only relevant rate for transactions between the 
United States and England.” (Sonndorfer, Technik, 1900 edition). Tate’s Modern Cambist provides 
similar evidence. 
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they were posted in Lyonnais’ Lisbon subsidiary, the Crédit Franco-Portugais. These were the 
over-the-counter prices at which the bank would sell or buy foreign drafts. As any bank, the 
Crédit Franco-Portugais could draw on, or remit in, any imaginable center. For instance, Crédit 
lyonnais, which had a branch in Saint-Petersburg, could easily sell a Russian bill to a 
Portuguese customer. For other centers, it could do the same using foreign correspondents.  
Comparing the bid-ask spreads posted by the Crédit Franco-Portugais for drafts on centers 
quoted in the Lisbon market and on centers not quoted there provides a test of our main 
proposition (Table 1). Our source for the Lisbon foreign exchange market is the Jornal do 
Comercio, the main business journal. As can be seen, the lowest bid-ask spreads (less than 
0.5% for bills on London, Paris, Berlin, or Amsterdam) were precisely for the centers that 
featured most prominently in the foreign exchange market listings. Countries that were not 
part of the foreign exchange market listings had typically higher spreads (above 1% and 
much higher). Quotation is therefore a predictor of a narrow bid-ask spread. 
*** Insert Table 1 about here *** 
Table 1 also shows that, on the margin, variations across posted spreads reflected Crédit 
lyonnais’ competitive position as we know it from the work of historians such as Jean 
Bouvier: its branch in Russia, its tight links with Scandinavia as well as Belgium and 
Switzerland, are associated with lower bid-ask spreads despite these countries’ currencies 
not being quoted in the Lisbon foreign exchange market.19 Conversely, lack of direct 
connections with the US, Spain, and Italy explain the relatively high posted spreads. The 
same mechanism must have operated for Crédit Franco-Portugais‘s local competitors. In 
aggregate, currencies supplied by many competitors had low bid ask spreads and found 
their way in the Jornal do Comercio. In other words, viewing liquidity as an underlying 
unobservable variable, we can think of the observable variable “does quote/does not quote” 
as an index that takes value one when liquidity in a given market reaches a certain critical 
“liquidity threshold” and zero otherwise: “quoted” is synonymous for “liquid in that 
                                                       
19  Bouvier, Crédit lyonnais. 
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center.” Network matrices provide a bitmap image of the grayscales of international 
liquidity. 
Data collection 
We then set to investigate individual countries’ listings. The discovery of a huge collection 
of stock exchange listings and business newspapers corresponding to the period 1870-1920, 
and implausibly kept by Crédit lyonnais near Bayeux in Normandy, more famous for Queen 
Mathilde’s Tapestry and apple brandy, enabled us to compile information for a fairly large 
number of markets. We then searched missing countries one after the other. The material was 
also checked against secondary sources such as contemporary foreign exchange handbooks: 
in English language, Tate’s cambist,20 in French, Ottomar Haupt’s Arbitrages et parités, and in 
German, Rudolf Sonndorfer’s Technik des Welthandels. The handbooks were found to be less 
reliable than primary listings but for the idiosyncratic centers with no identifiable foreign 
exchange lists (such as Colombo) they could not be surpassed. The resulting database spans 
almost the entire world. 
Data collection only raised two substantive points. The first was to decide how restrictive 
our definition of “liquidity” should be. As seen in Figure 1, the US dollar was not listed in 
the 1880 London “Course of Exchange”. Nor was it listed in 1890, 1900 and 1910. In 1912, 
Rudolf Sonndorfer argued that “little transactions in US dollars are taking place in 
London”.21 Clearly, the dollar was not a very liquid currency in London, and our 
                                                       
20 In the later part of the 19th century, Tate’s Cambist  was taken up by a number of different editors: 
Schmidt for the 1893 edition; Easton for the 1908 edition. 
21 Sonndorfer, Technik, 4th edition, p. 246. The Economist began reporting a line for New York as 
early as in the 1850s, but it remained consistently empty for decades. In Paris, the US dollar starts 
being listed in 1880, but there again, no transactions are reported unti l the 1890s when a moderately 
active market seems to be emerging. 
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dichotomous variable accounts for that. But there were less obvious cases as well, with 
currencies occasionally quoted. This was the case, for instance, for the dollar in London 
before 1880. Our strategy was to construct two “nested” databases. A narrow database is 
defined to include only those currencies for which we have evidence of an active market. A 
broad database includes all currencies for which we have traces of transactions. The narrow 
database is superior, but using the large database does not make a big difference for 
empirical results in large part because the two databases only differ on the margin. The rest 
of the paper focuses on the narrow database. Both databases are available upon request. 
The second issue was to decide how to deal with countries with several foreign exchange 
centers, such as Belgium (Antwerp and Brussels), Germany (Hamburg, Berlin, Frankfort), 
Italy (Milan, Genoa, Rome, Turin and Florence), or the United States (New York, New 
Orleans, Chicago, San Francisco.) One possibility would have been to identify centers rather 
than countries. However, this was not feasible since a number of listings aggregated foreign 
regional markets: instead of quoting, say, “Antwerp” and/or “Brussels” they reported 
“Belgian centers” (most probably because of nationwide clearing arrangements that made 
regional centers close substitutes to one another for foreign dealers.) Given this situation, 
aggregating along national lines was the only sensible option. 
The network of international exchange 1890-1910 
The main features of networks can be summarized through a set of descriptive statistics: 
measures of average distances, measures of centrality, and groupings.22 
 The four “Ds”: dyads, density, distribution, distance 
The basic unit of analysis in a network is the ”dyad”. Dyads record relations between 
two individuals in a pair. They take three possible forms: zero connection, one connection, or 
                                                       
22 Wasserman and Faust, Network analysis. 
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two connections and are denoted as “(0, 0)”, “(1, 0)” and “(0, 1), or (1, 1)”. In 1900 for 
instance, the dyad “Britain and Argentina”, is equal to (0,1). 
Density refers to the number of links in the network (number of times xij=1), compared 
with the number of possible links (Nx(N-1)). Suppose that the likelihood to have a link 
between two countries is 50-50. The density ratio is then 0.5. As shown in table 2, about 
90% of the possible links were zeros: pre-1914 international monetary relations formed a 
highly parsimonious network. 
Distribution of the dyadic links is another important variable. Their distribution across 
the three groups (0, 0), ((1, 0) or (0, 1)), and (1, 1) can be compared with what would obtain 
if links were drawn randomly (given the network density, which tells the probability to have 
a link between i and j). Table 2 shows that our network has less (0,1) and (1,0) but more 
(0,0) and almost four times as much (1,1) than implied by a random drawing. This suggests 
a greater tendency, ceteris paribus, towards reciprocal links. 
Distance measures the average minimum number of “stops” that one needs to make in 
order to go from one country to another. This measure is taken regardless of the direction of 
the connection. In 1890, going from Argentina to China involved two possible shortest routes, 
each two stops long.23 Distance thus measures the “closeness” of agents in the network. As 
seen in Table 2, the average distance is around 1.80, meaning that on average it takes less 
than two stops to go from one currency/financial center to another one: all countries are 
either directly connected, or more often, connected via a third one. This points towards a 
highly hierarchical system. 
                                                       
23 These were (a) Buenos Aires-London and London-Shanghai and (b) Buenos Aires-Paris and 
Paris-Shanghai. 
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“In-” and “out-” degrees 
This brings to the fore the question of centrality. Network statisticians study centrality by 
focusing on the individual level. There are two ways an individual can relate to others: he or 
she can “send” or “receive” links. The corresponding links counts are known respectively as 
“out-degrees” and “in-degrees” or more informally “expansiveness” (propensity to “name” 
others) and “popularity” (tendency to be “named” by others). Figure 2 presents the in- and 
out-scores. The ranking is made according to the in-degrees, since “popularity” is the 
relevant criterion to judge the extent of foreign circulation of a given currency. Out-degrees by 
contrast probably reflect in part the heterogeneity of data sources, in part local foreign 
exchange market arrangements which caused some “Courses of the exchange” to report 
systematically more currencies than others, and in part structural characteristics leading 
some countries to diversify over a larger range of foreign currencies. 
*** Insert Figure 2 about here *** 
As, seen, in 1900, three senior centers stand out: London, Paris and Berlin/Germany in 
descending order. On the other end of the spectrum, we get a long list of countries that are 
quoted almost nowhere, such as Uruguay (only quoted by Argentina). This group comprises 
Latin American and Asian nations. Another important feature is the existence of a fairly 
large “middle class” between the two extremes. This class contains the United States, North-
Western European centres (Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland). It also reveals some 
surprises: Austria-Hungary, Italy, Spain, and to an extent Russia. 
A possible limitation of the in-degrees as a measure of centrality is that they fail to weigh 
individual quotes according to the importance of those from whom they come. That 
Montevideo is quoted in Buenos Aires is not the same thing as being quoted in London. One 
can think of many different exogenous variables to weigh a quote in Argentina against a 
quote in Great Britain. We propose here an approach that is based on the intrinsic 
characteristics of the network, relying on the work of Stanley Wasserman and Katherine 
Faust, who present a whole family of status or “rank prestige” measures. The general idea is 
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that the prestige of an actor depends not only on the number of times he or she is chosen but 
also on the prestige of those who choose him or her. An actor chosen by a lot of prestigious 
actors should also enjoy a high prestige, while someone selected by low ranked actors only 
should not. The interpretation for our monetary network is simple: a currency is more central 
if it is quoted in markets that are themselves home to a central currency. The result is an 
alternative centrality criterion, known as “eigenvector centrality”.24 
Figure 3 contrasts “eigenvector centrality” in 1900 with the earlier “popularity” index. 
The hierarchy within the leading trio of pound, franc and mark disappears: that the pound is 
quoted everywhere no longer makes a difference since franc and mark are quoted in all 
”relevant” places. By the same account, the centrality of the Belgian and the Swiss franc, the 
lira and the Austrian crown increases significantly reflecting the fact that these currencies are 
quoted in markets that are themselves relevant. The same is to a lesser extent true for 
Scandinavian nations who benefit from their being quoted in Berlin. The big loser, on the 
other hand, is the US dollar, because it is mainly quoted in North and South America and 
East Asia, and not in the European centers. 
*** Insert Figure 3 about here *** 
These results are suggestive: By discriminating between more and less weighty markets, 
eigenvector centrality captures perhaps more closely the idea of a currency’s “catchment 
area”. We can thus identify a tightly knitted group of countries around London, Paris and 
Berlin, which includes Belgium or the Netherlands but also Italy and Austria-Hungary. In a 
second row we find the Iberian and Scandinavian countries, as well as Russia. These manage 
to extend their reach through listing in some leading foreign exchange market. It is to this 
second row that the US can be compared, as a result of the “junior” status of the quotes it 
receives. 
                                                       
24 For the derivation of the eigenvector centrali ty measure see Appendix 3. 
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Cliques 
The previous discussion leads to another way of looking at interconnectedness. The idea 
is to identify “cliques”, that is, groups of countries that have fully symmetrical relations. 
Members of a given “clique” do quote and are quoted by every other members of the same 
clique. Of course, any sub-group of a given clique is a clique, so that in practice it is enough 
to report the largest possible cliques. Results are presented in Table 3. Cliques tend to be 
predominantly European. Within Europe, some regional sub-groups are also discernible, such 
as the North Western European groups, the German-Scandinavian group, etc. We also have 
some smaller (three members) cliques emerging after 1900 in Asia (the Hong Kong, Shanghai, 
Bombay, and the Tokyo, Shanghai, Bombay triangles). This is in striking contrast with the 
Latin American world. 
*** Insert Table 3 about here *** 
 1900: a map 
To conclude, we provide a map for 1900. Arrows represent foreign exchange relations: for 
instance an arrow pointing from Portugal to Spain means that the Spanish currency is 
available in Lisbon. We have divided the map in two parts. The upper left part represents 
links between European and non-European nations. The bottom right part represents links 
among European nations. As seen, there are heavy links towards and within Europe, 
virtually no links within Latin America, and some links within Asia. The only non-European 
“hub” are the United States. 
*** Insert Figure 4 about here *** 
Identifying Currency Groups: A Model 
We have seen that some countries have similar ways to interact with one another and 
with third parties. For instance, France and England quote each other and are quoted by 
almost all non-European nations. It would be very useful, therefore, to generalize the concept 
of “cliques” and put together individuals in “classes” defined by homogeneous intra-class 
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and inter-class patterns. We do this by applying “block-modelling”, a network analysis 
method that groups actors by identifying classes of countries (or “actors”) that have similar 
relational patterns. In an ideal case, the classes would fully determine its members’ relational 
patterns: countries in the same class would be tied to other countries in exactly the same 
way: they would be said to be “structurally equivalent”. Description of a network 
comprising many agents then boils down to specifying relations among a few groups of 
individuals. 
Imagine for instance that our monetary network only has two types of countries. “C” 
countries would always quote each other and never quote “P” countries. “P” countries 
would never quote each other but always “C” countries. One could then refer to “C” 
countries as core countries, characterized by supremacy over the “P” nations, while “P” 
countries would be adequately termed peripheral, as they would hobnob to the international 
monetary system via the intermediation of “C” countries. Such a perfect equivalence, if it did 
exist, would be empirically easy to identify. Of course, our monetary network does not 
display this very appealing feature. 
However, we can look for “near structural equivalence”. This means putting the analysis 
into a stochastic framework, and assuming that network links across groups are drawn from 
probability distributions: if they belong to the same class, countries i and j have the same ex 
ante probability to quote currency k. Ex post, they may end up with different realized links 
with k. But on average they will quote k just as often. The idea is therefore to back up the 
network structure from the realized (a posteriori) observed links. In the end, block-modelling 
identifies the structure that fits the data best.25 
Here is how the program works: it seeks to infer from the data how many different 
(latent) classes of actors can be distinguished and to which class each actor belongs. It does 
so by estimating the posterior probability distribution of a given class structure. Membership 
                                                       
25 See Wang and Wong, “Blockmodels”; and Nowicki and Snijders “Estimation and prediction.” 
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of the actors in certain classes and the probabilities of ties between and within the classes 
are determined in an iterative procedure that seeks to maximize the likelihood of the 
observed patterns. Block-modelling then provides goodness-of-fit statistics to assess a 
particular partition of actors into classes, as well as probabilities regarding the membership 
of individual countries in a given group. This is a powerful way to provide firm statements 
about the geography of money. 
A three-tier world 
Identifying the number of groups requires trading off detail (summarized in the 
“Information” statistic, or Iy) against relevance (measured by the “Clarity” statistic or Hx).26 
Information and Clarity are maximized when their corresponding statistics are minimized. 
The intuition for why there should be two statistics rather than one is the following: just like 
the R2 gets improved in standard regressions by adding new explanatory variables, 
Information is always improved by adding new categories: there is therefore a need to adjust 
the amount of “Information” provided by increasing categories by the amount of “Clarity” 
this yields. However, unlike what happens in standard regression analysis, there does not 
exist at this stage any statistic to weigh Information against Clarity, so that output must be 
interpreted carefully. 
Results are reported in Table 4. A big gain in terms of Information is always obtained by 
going from 2 to 3 groups. This result is confirmed by the Clarity criterion, which is minimized 
for 3 groups in 1890 and for 2 or 3 groups in 1900. For 1910 the results are less obvious, with 
4 groups being a possibility. However, as we shall see later, the 4 groups are really 
embedded in a 3 groups system. The overall conclusion, therefore, is that the three-tier 
                                                       
26 Computations were performed using StOCNET, a popular open software program to deal with 
block-models. See Boer et al. StOCNET and http://stat.gamma.rug.nl/stocnet/. The procedures are 
explained in Snijders and Nowicki, Manual. 
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structure is the one that fits the data best. There were three, not two, groups of countries in 
the international monetary system of the late 19th century, and rather than describing it in 
terms of “core” and “periphery”, we should refer to “key”, “intermediate” and “peripheral” 
countries. 
*** Insert Table 4 about here *** 
Let’s now consider the composition of each group (Table 5). We focus on the three-tier 
grouping. The key currency group is the most clearly identified.27 It comprises, for all periods, 
the pound, the franc and the mark. This matches Peter Lindert’s identification of these very 
three as the leading currencies in the late 19th century. Note that Lindert’s conclusions rested 
on evidence that these “key” currencies were held by foreign central banks. 28 Of course, for 
foreign exchange market intervention one prefers a currency with a liquid market, which 
squares nicely with our starting assumption. 
The second group of intermediary currencies mostly comprises European nations. The 
surprise is that in this category we do find, besides the US, both the likes of Switzerland, 
Belgium or the Netherlands and countries such as Austria-Hungary, Russia, Italy, and Spain. 
However, this finding is in line with recent work, which has found evidence for supposedly 
“peripheral” countries, such as Austria-Hungary, of exchange rate management techniques 
that have conventionally been associated with “core nations”. Unlike ‘genuine’ peripheral 
countries, such nations seemed had a “European” (if not an international) circulation that 
made them more similar to their North-Western European counterparts.29 Due to their links 
                                                       
27 The probabil i ty for the three currencies to be in the same group is always higher than 90%, and 
the probabil i ty for al l other currencies to be among the key group inferior to 10%. 
28 Lindert, Key currencies. 
29 Standard accounts of “core” countries exchange rate management techniques may be found in 
Eichengreen and Flandreau, Gold Standard; Flandreau and Komlos, “Target zones”, argue that 
Austro-Hungarian monetary policy rel ied on stabil izing foreign speculation. 
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with Germany and their close connections among each other, Scandinavian countries 
(Denmark, Norway and Sweden) are found at the margin of this European club in 1910.30  
Finally, the periphery regroups those nations, whose currencies are nowhere to be found 
apart in their domestic market and maybe in one neighboring country. These include Latin 
America (Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Cuba, Venezuela, Ecuador and 
Uruguay), some Colonial or Commonwealth nations (Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the 
Dutch East Indies, Ceylon, French Indochina, Egypt and the Philippines) and the European 
South-East border (Turkey, Greece, Romania, Serbia). Highly interesting is the Asian 
subgroup within the periphery, consisting of China, Hong Kong, British India, Japan and the 
Strait Settlements (Singapore).31 While these countries are clearly peripheral in their relations 
with the key and the intermediate group, they differ from the other peripheral countries by 
being connected among themselves. This fabric is much less densely woven than in Europe, 
but it marks a clear contrast to Latin America, Australasia or the Balkans, which are 
exclusively oriented towards Europe. 
*** Insert Table 5 about here *** 
Group membership is stable, but there are exceptions. In a similar exercise for 1880, based 
on substantially less countries and therefore not reported here, we found the Dutch Guilder 
and the Belgian Franc in the key currency group. They decline afterwards. The fate of the 
United States dollar did experience an opposite trend. In 1880, one could not reject its 
membership in the periphery. In 1890 we find it in the intermediate category and in 1900 it 
was still probably more on par, as far as international circulation is concerned, with such 
currencies as the Dutch guilder or the Belgian franc than with the British pound, French franc, 
                                                       
30 Whi le grouped with the European club in 1910, al l three have probabil i ties between 30 and 
40% to be in fact with the peripheral group. 
31 The blockmodel suggests this fourth cluster as optimal for 1910 only, but the group appears in 
1890 and 1900 as well, as soon as a four-tier structure is al lowed. 
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or German mark. It is only in 1910 that we find it emerging on the top of the intermediary 
league.32 This rapid rise distinguishes it from any other country in the world. At the same 
time, this ascendancy seems somewhat delayed given that by 1910 the US economy had 
already taken over in many areas. This is undoubtedly something that future research should 
focus on. 
Finally, if we restrict the software to grouping countries on the basis of a two-tier system, 
we inevitably fall back on a list of “core” countries that essentially pools the list of “key” 
and “intermediate” countries: thus, if we really want to picture global monetary relations as 
a dual system, then we should be prepare to grant seniority to a much larger pool of nations 
than research has so far acknowledged. The superior alternative is to recognize that there 
were really three groups. 
It is now time to provide a simplified characterization of the international monetary 
system. This is done in Figure 5. A straight arrow from group A to group B does mean 
“members of group A do quote members of group B with probability x” (reported near the 
arrow). Reflexive arrows mean “members of group A do quote counterparts in group A with 
probability x” (reported near the arrow). As seen, key countries always quote each other’s 
currency (100%). They generally quote intermediate countries (92%) but barely any 
peripheral countries. Intermediate countries almost always quote key currencies (96%), and 
fellow intermediate currencies half of the time (45%). They never quote peripheral currencies. 
Finally, peripheral countries almost never quote each other (3%), rarely the intermediate 
currencies (10%), and most of the key currencies (75%). 
Two conclusions are in order. First, as is apparent in Figure 5, the pre-1914 international 
monetary order exhibited much hierarchy. Second, key countries and intermediary countries 
had almost symmetrical relations so that in a world restricted to these two groups, there 
                                                       
32 “The top of the intermediary league” means the fol lowing: at that date, while clearly in the 
intermediary group, it has the largest probabil i ty in its class to be part of the key currencies. 
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would be no real point opposing one group to the other one. In effect, it is the periphery that 
enables to discriminate between the two top groups, through the sharp contrast between the 
relationships it entertained with each category. In other words, it is the periphery that 
permits to tell the key and intermediary groups apart. 
Conclusions 
This paper started from the premise that any country’s adjustment mechanism depends 
heavily on the degree of the international circulation of its currency. We identified an 
indicator of international liquidity, captured by a dichotomous variable reflecting the 
existence of directional relations between countries’ financial markets. Such variables are 
amenable to modern network analysis techniques, and we provided a procedure for 
automatically identifying “core” and “peripheral” nations around 1890-1910. 
This procedure yielded a striking result. The monetary order of the late 19th century is best 
described as having been made of at least three groups, rather than the two groups generally 
referred to. Specifically, we found, between Peter Lindert’s “key currencies” (pound sterling, 
franc and mark), and the currencies in Alec Ford’s “periphery” (the Argentine peso being the 
archetype), a middle class, mostly made up of European nations, but through which the 
United States passed on its way to the top. Alternatively, if only two groups are to be 
identified, then we are bound to call “core” nations a much broader group than is 
conventionally considered. Most strikingly, such countries as Italy, or Russia, Spain, or 
Austria-Hungary were definitely not peripheral. Their currencies enjoyed a regional 
circulation and were known to bankers in a number of leading European centers. 
We hope that these findings will provide a firmer basis for future empirical work seeking 
to contrast economic performances in alternative groups of countries. The classifications 
reported in Table 5 can motivate more rigorously the use of separate regressions for different 
groups. Similarly, the indices of centrality that we constructed can be used as controls of the 
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influence of centrality in econometric work. For the convenience of future research, the 
readers can find in Appendix 1 two brands of centrality indices. 
Future research will need to explain the emergence of the structure we identified, and to 
measure carefully how much it did matter. The first question is Terra Incognita. On the 
second issue, research is also needed, but there is already evidence that the structure 
identified did matter. For instance, we know that “core” and “intermediary” countries were 
able to circulate debts denominated in their own currency on foreign markets, while members 
of the periphery were not.33 Similarly, recent research has reported evidence of a greater 
contribution of exchange rate movements to external adjustments in countries belonging to 
our “periphery” – unsurprisingly given that they could not borrow so easily abroad.34 More 
work is needed to go beyond these general remarks. But we believe our findings might open 
new perspectives. These perspectives should, at the very least, have the potential to free us 
from the conventional reference, when it comes to explaining the pre-1914 international 
monetary order, to those famous “rules of the game” of which it is only known that they 
never existed. 
Paris, April 2005 
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Appendix 1: Two Centrality Indices: Core =100, Periphery=0 
  Un-weighted Weighted 
  1890 1900 1910 1890 1900 1910 
Argentina ARG 0 0 2 0 0 0 
Australia AUS 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Austria-Hungary AUH 20 25 32 62 84 84 
Belgium BEL 20 27 32 74 81 76 
Brazil BRA 0 2 2 0 0 0 
British India IND 11 14 14 0 0 2 
Canada CAN 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ceylon CEY 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Chile CHL 0 0 0 0 0 0 
China CHN 7 11 11 0 0 2 
Columbia COL 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cuba CUB 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Denmark DNK 7 7 9 15 17 27 
Dutch East Indies 
(Java) JAV 2 2 0 0 0 0 
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Ecuador ECU 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Egypt EGY 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Finland FIN 0 2 2 0 2 3 
France FRA 75 80 86 100 100 100 
French Indochina ICH 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Germany DEU 50 59 70 93 95 99 
Greece GRC 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hong Kong HKG 11 14 11 0 0 7 
I taly ITA 20 18 32 71 70 81 
Japan JPN 2 7 11 0 0 8 
Mexico MEX 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Netherlands NLD 30 27 36 85 85 94 
New Zealand NZL 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Norway NOR 5 7 9 4 17 27 
Ottoman Empire OTT 0 0 2 0 0 0 
Persia PRS 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Peru PER 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Philippines PHL 0 2 2 0 0 1 
Portugal PRT 9 5 9 40 13 32 
Rumania RO M 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Russia RU S 9 9 23 40 38 70 
S erbia S ER 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Siam S IA 0 0 2 0 0 0 
Spain E SP 14 16 18 57 48 44 
S trait settlements 
( Singapore) S GP 5 7 5 0 0 1 
Sweden SWE 7 9 11 15 20 33 
Switzerland CHE 11 18 20 54 82 75 
United Kingdom GBR 100 100 100 100 100 100 
United Sta tes U SA 23 25 43 28 27 65 
Uruguay URY 2 2 2 0 0 0 
Venezuela VEN 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Note: The un-weighted index the ratio of the number of quotes received to the total potential number of quotes (N-1) 
multiplied by 100. The weighted index is the eigenvector centrality measure normalized by the ratio of the most central country 
(GBR), multiplied by 100 (see appendix 3). Country codes based on ISO 3166 with some adjustments (countries that have 
disappeared, etc.) 
Appendix 2: Sources 
Country Markets Sources 
Argentina Buenos Aires La Nacion [1890-1910] 
Bolsa de Comercio de Buenos Aires. Boletin Quincenal de Precios 
Corrientes [1900] 
Memoria de la Camara Sindical de Bolsa de Comercio de Buenos 
Aires correspondiente al año de 1889, and Memoria [...] de 1890 
[1890] 
Australia Adelaide, 
Melbourne, 
Sydney 
The Australasian Insurance and Banking Record [1890-1910] 
TMC 1893, 1908 
Austria-Hungary Budapest Pester Lloyd [1890-1900] 
A Budapesti Árú- és Értéktózsde Hivatalos Árjegyzó Lapja [1910] 
Austria-Hungary Vienna Amtliches Cursblatt der Wiener Börse [1890-1910] 
Belgium Antwerp Cote Officielle de la Bourse d’Anvers [1890-1910] 
Belgium Brussels Cours Authentique. Seul officiel, publié par la commission instituée 
en vertu de la loi du 11 juin 1883 [1890, 1900, 1910] 
Brazil Rio de Janeiro Jornal do Commercio [1890, 1900, 1910] 
British India Bombay Times of India [1890, 1900, 1910 (mail edition)] 
British India Calcutta TMC 1893, 1908 
Canada Montreal, The Monetary Times [1890-1910] 
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Toronto The Montreal Gazette 
TMC 1908 
Ceylon Colombo SD 1889, 1900, 1905, 1912 
TMC 1908 
Chile Valparaiso, 
Santiago 
El Mercurio [Valparaiso 1890], El Ferrocarril [Santiago 1900, 
1910] 
China Shanghai North China Herald [1910] 
Columbia Bogotá SD 1889, 1900 
TMC 1893 1908 
Cuba Havana SD 1889, 1900, 1905, 1912 
TMC 1893 1908 
Denmark Copenhagen Den danske Landsmandsbank Hypthek og Vekselbank i 
Kjøbenhavn. Börsenkurs d … [1890] 
Privatbanken i Kjøbenhavn (no title) [1900] 
Kjøbenhavns Handelsbank (no title) [1910] 
Dutch East Indies 
(Java) 
Batavia Jaarcijfers uitgegeven door de Centrale Commissie voor de 
Statistiek. Kolonien [1890-1910, volume 1921 for exchange rates 
with Singapore 1910] 
SD 1889, 1900, 1905, 1912 
TMC 1893, 1908 
Ecuador Guayaquil SD 1889, 1900, 1905, 1912 
TMC 1908 
Egypt Cairo SD 1889, 1900, 1905, 1912 
TMC 1893, 1908 
Finland Helsingfors TMC 1893, 1908 
France Paris L’Economiste Français [1890-1910] 
La Semaine Financière [1890-1910] 
Germany  Berlin Cours-Bericht (Verlag der Hertel’schen Cours-Berichte) [1890] 
Hertel’scher Cours-Bericht [1900, 1910] 
Germany Frankfurt Oeffentliches Börsen-Coursblatt des Wechselmakler-Syndicats zu 
Frankfurt a. M. [1890] 
Öffentliches Börsen-Kursblatt der Maklerkammer zu Frankfurt a. 
M. [1910] 
Germany Hamburg Amtlicher Kursbericht. Herausgegeben vom Börsenvorstand [1900, 
1910] 
Greece Athens ΧΡΗΜΑΤΙΣΤΙΡΙΟΝ ΑΘΗΝΩΝ [1890, 1900] 
SD 1889, 1900, 1905, 1912 
TMC 1908 
Hong Kong Hong Kong China Mail [1890-1910] 
Indochina Saigon Bulletin de la Chambre de Commerce de Saigon [1900] 
TMC 1893, 1908 
Italy Florence Estratto del Listino Officiale della Borsa [1890, 1900] 
Italy Genoa Banca Commerciale Italiana. Corsi di chiusura della Borsa di 
Genova del … [1910] 
Listino Ufficiale della Borsa di Genova [1910] 
Italy Milan Bollettino ufficiale della Borsa di Milano [1890] 
Bollettino ufficiale della Borsa [1900] 
Listino ufficiale della Borsa di Milano [1910] 
Italy Rome Listino officiale della Borsa di Commercio di Roma [1890] 
Listino ufficiale [sic] della Borsa die Roma [1900, 1910] 
Japan Yokohama Hundred Years Statistics of the Japanese Economy 
SD1889, 1900, 1905, 1912 
TMC 1908 
Mexico Mexico El Economista Mexicano [1890-1910] 
Netherlands Amsterdam Cours-Officiel de la Bourse  (Publié par le Comité) [1890-1900] 
Cours-Officiel de la Bourse d’Amsterdam (Publié par le Comité) 
[1910] 
New Zealand Dunedin The Australasian Insurance and Banking Record [1890-1910] 
Norway Christiana Thon, E. and R. Due. Kristiania Børs 1819-1919, Et tilbakeblikk ved 
100 aars jubilæet. Christiania, 1919. 
Ramm, H. I næringslivets tjeneste. Christiania Børs 1819-1924. Oslo 
børs 1925-1969. Oslo, 1969. 
Rygg, N. Norges Banks historie, annen del. Oslo, 1954. 
Øyvind, E., J. T. Klovland and J. Qvigstad. “Historical Monetary 
Statistics for Norway 1819-2003.” Norges Banks Occasional 
Papers 35. Oslo, 2004. 
Ottoman Empire Constantinople SD1889, 1900, 1905, 1912 
TMC 1893, 1908 
(Additional information from the following newspapers: Die Freie 
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Post [1899], Osmanischer Lloyd [1913], Iqtiham [1912]) 
Persia Teheran, Bushire TMC 1893, 1908 
Peru Lima, Callao SD1889, 1900, 1905, 1912 
TMC 1893, 1908 
Philippines Manila SD1889, 1900, 1905, 1912 
TMC 1893, 1908 
Portugal Lisbon Jornal do Comercio [1890-1910] 
Rumania Bucharest Bursa din Bucuresci. Serviciul “Curierului Financiar” [1900] 
Bursa din Bucuresci. Serviciul Jurnalului “Curierului Financiar” 
[1910] 
SD 1889 
Russia Moscow Cote de la Bourse de Moscou. Edition du Comité de la Bourse de 
Moscou [1910] 
Russia Petersburg Cote officielle de la Bourse de St. Pétersbourg [1890-1900] 
Russia Warsaw Cote officielle de la Bourse de Varsovie [1890-1910] 
Serbia Beograd SD1889, 1900, 1905, 1912 
Siam Bangkok SD 1905, 1912 
TMC 1893, 1908 
Singapore Singapore TMC 1893, 1908 
Spain Barcelona Cambios Corrientes dados por la Junta de Gobernio del Colegio de 
Corredores Reales de comercio de la plaza de Barcelona [1890-
1900] 
Boletin Oficial de Cambios Corrientes dados por la Junta de 
Gobernio del Colegio de Corredores Reales de comercio de la plaza 
de Barcelona [1910] 
Spain Bilbao Boletin de Cotizacion Oficial de la Bolsa de Comercio de Bilbao 
[1900-1910] 
Spain Madrid Boletin de Cotizacion Oficial de la Bolsa de Comercio de Madrid 
[1890-1910] 
Sweden Stockholm Post & Inrikes Tidning [1890-1910] 
(Aftonbladet, Dagens Nyheter occasionally) 
Switzerland Basel Basler Börse: Oeffentliches Coursblatt der beeidigten Sensalen 
[1890] 
Bankverein Suisse. Cours official de la Bourse de Bâle [1900, 
1910] 
Switzerland Geneva Bourse de Genève [1890] 
Cote journalière de la Bourse de Genève publié par la Société des 
Agents de Change [1910]  
Switzerland Zurich Kursblatt der Zürcher Effektenbörse [1900, 1910] 
United Kingdom London The Economist [1880-1910] 
United States Chicago Chicago Tribune [1891-1910] 
United States  New Orleans The Daily Picayune [1882, 1912] 
United States New York Commercial and Financial Chronicle, New York Times, Wall Street 
Journal [all 1890-1910] 
SD1889, 1900, 1905, 1912 
United States San Francisco The Bulletin [1890-1910] 
Uruguay Montevideo SD 1889, 1900, 1905, 1912 
TMC 1893, 1908 
Venezuela Caracas SD 1889, 1900, 1905, 1912 
TMC 1893, 1908 
 
Note: TMC and SD refer respectively to Tate’s Modern cambist and Sonndorfer followed by the 
year of the edition used. 
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Appendix 3. 
Following Wasserman and Faust, 35 we take the network matrix X  and define p  to be a vector of 
rank prestige measures 
i
p  ( i !  [1,n]), 
i
p  is the sum of the lp ’s of al l actors choosing i. Call ing lix  
the variable that indicates whether actors l quotes i or not, we get for al l i: 
nniiii
pxpxpxp +++= …
2211
 
Or matrix notation: 
pXp
T
=  
To solve for p, note that p is the eigenvector of the transpose TX  corresponding to an eigenvalue 
of 1. In general, TX  won’t have an eigenvalue of 1. What we do here is choose as p  the eigenvector 
corresponding to the largest eigenvalue.36 To render the rank prestige measure comparable with the 
indegree popularity, we normalize by dividing through the rank of the highest ranked country, 
which is Brita in in our case. Multiplying by 100 gives the weighted centrali ty measure depicted in 
figure 3 and tabulated in appendix 1. 
                                                       
35 Wasserman and Faust, Network analysis. 
36 For alternatives see Wasserman and Faust, Network analysis. Bonacich and Lloyd, “Measures of 
centrali ty”, compare a number of eigenvector-l ike measures of centrali ty and show that these are 
equivalent under the assumption or rule, also adopted here, that actors not chosen by anyone have a 
rank of zero and can thus not contribute to the rank of the actors they choose. 
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Table 1. Posted Bid-Ask Spreads of Crédit Franco-Portugais, January 1910 
 
Foreign exchange center posted bid-ask 
spreads in % 
Countries whose center is quoted Lisbon in January 1910  
England 0.27 
France 0.50 
Germany 0.40 
Italy 1.00 
Holland 0.48 
Spain 1.07 
United States 0.97 
Average 0.67 
 
Countries whose financial center is not quoted in Lisbon in January 1910 
 
Belgium 0.83 
Switzerland 0.83 
Austria-Hungary 1.44 
Russia 0.93 
Scandinavia 1.44 
Brazil 13.79 
(All other centers) (min. 13.79) 
Average 3.21 
Average excluding Brazil 1.10 
 
Source: Archives du Crédit lyonnais, “Crédit Franco-Portugais”, Jornal do Comercio. 
 
Table 2. Structural properties 
  1890 1900 1910 
Density  0.098 0.110 0.133 
     
Pairs in % 
(if random 
%) 
(0,0) 
84.3 
(81.4) 
82.7 
(79.2) 
79.6 
(75.1) 
 (1,0) or (0,1) 
11.7 
(17.7) 
12.5 
(19.6) 
14.1 
(23.1) 
 (1,1) 
3.9 
(1.0) 
4.7 
(1.2) 
6.3 
(1.8) 
     
Distance  1.843 1.827 1.796 
 
Notes: Random distributions are computed conditional upon the network density, i.e. if the network density is 
0.110, we assume that there is a 11% probability that there exists a link between country i and country j. 
Source: Authors’ computations. 
 
 
Table 3. Monetary cliques at three dates 
 1890 1900 1910 
7 countries   1:  BEL CHE DEU FRA GBR ITA NLD 
2:  AUH CHE DEU FRA GBR ITA NLD 
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6 countries  1:  AUH CHE DEU FRA GBR ITA 
2:  AUH CHE DEU FRA GBR NLD 
3:  BEL CHE DEU FRA GBR ITA 
4:  BEL CHE DEU FRA GBR NLD 
3:  CHE DEU FRA ITA NLD USA 
4:  AUH DEU FRA GBR NLD RUS 
5 countries 1:  AUH BEL DEU FRA GBR 
2:  BEL DEU FRA GBR NLD 
3 : AUH BEL CHE DEU FRA 
 5:  DEU DNK NLD NOR SWE 
 
4 countries 4:  DEU FRA GBR ITA 
5:  DEU FRA GBR PRT 
6:  DEU FRA GBR RUS 
7:  CHE DEU FRA ITA 
5:  DEU FRA GBR RUS 
6:  DEU DNK NOR SWE 
6:  DEU NLD SWE USA 
7:  DEU ESP FRA GBR 
8:  DEU FRA GBR PRT 
3 countries 8:  DEU FRA USA 
9:  DEU DNK SWE 
10:  ESP FRA GBR 
11:  DNK NOR SWE 
7:  DEU FRA USA 
8:  CHN HKG IND 
9:  CHN IND JPN 
9:  CHN HKG IND 
10:  CHN IND JPN 
Source: Authors’ computations. 
 
Table 4. How many groups? 
 # groups Information Clarity 
  yI  xH  
1890  0.522  
 2 groups 0.408 0.169 
 3 groups 0.321 0.105 
 4 groups 0.293 0.177 
 5 groups 0.280 0.181 
1900  0.562  
 2 groups 0,433 0,045 
 3 groups 0,351 0,088 
 4 groups 0,320 0,319 
 5 groups 0,307 0,308 
1910  0.632  
 2 groups 0,468 0,034 
 3 groups 0,388 0,113 
 4 groups 0,347 0,060 
 5 groups 0,325 0,144 
 
Notes: The posted values are averages from three Gibbs simulation runs with 100.000 iterations each. For details of the 
procedure, compare Snijders and Nowicki, Manual. The maximization procedure is repeated for different numbers of latent 
classes. The researcher chooses the optimal number of classes as a function of information I and clarity H as explained in 
the text. 
Source: Authors’ computations.  
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Table 5. Who with whom? Membership in a 2- and a 3-group world compared 
1890  1900  1910 
two-tier three-tier  two-tier three-tier  two-tier three-tier four-tier 
GBR, DEU, 
FRA, AUH, 
BEL, ITA, 
NLD, USA 
GBR, DEU, 
FRA 
 GBR, 
DEU, FRA, 
AUH, BEL, 
CHE, ESP, 
ITA, NLD, 
USA 
GBR, DEU, 
FRA 
 GBR, DEU, 
FRA, AUH, 
BEL, CHE, ESP, 
ITA, NLD, RUS, 
USA 
GBR, DEU, 
FRA 
GBR, DEU, 
FRA 
AUH, BEL, 
ITA, NLD, 
USA, CHE, 
ESP, PRT, RUS 
 AUH, BEL, 
CHE, ESP, ITA, 
NLD, RUS, USA 
 AUH, BEL, 
CHE, DNK, 
ESP, ITA, NLD, 
NOR, PRT, 
RUS, SWE, USA 
AUH, 
BEL, CHE, 
DNK, ESP, 
ITA, NLD, 
NOR, PRT, 
RUS, SWE, 
USA 
CHN, 
HKG, IND, 
JPN, SGP 
CHE, ESP, 
PRT, RUS, 
CHN, HKG, 
IND, SGP, 
ARG, AUS, 
BRA, CAN, 
CEY, CHL, 
COL, CUB, 
DNK, ECU, 
EGY, FIN, 
GRC, ICH, 
JAV, JPN, 
MEX, NOR, 
NZL, OTT, 
PER, PHL, 
PRS, ROM, 
SER, SIA, SWE, 
URY, VEN 
CHN, 
HKG, IND, 
SGP, ARG, 
AUS, BRA, 
CAN, CEY, 
CHL, COL, 
CUB, DNK, 
ECU, EGY, 
FIN, GRC, 
ICH, JAV, 
JPN, MEX, 
NOR, NZL, 
OTT, PER, 
PHL, PRS, 
ROM, SER, 
SIA, SWE, 
URY, VEN 
 
PRT, RUS, 
CHN, HKG, 
IND, SGP, 
ARG, AUS, 
BRA, CAN, 
CEY, CHL, 
COL, CUB, 
DNK, ECU, 
EGY, FIN, 
GRC, ICH, 
JAV, JPN, 
MEX, NOR, 
NZL, OTT, 
PER, PHL, 
PRS, ROM, 
SER, SIA, 
SWE, URY, 
VEN 
PRT, CHN, 
HKG, IND, 
SGP, ARG, 
AUS, BRA, 
CAN, CEY, 
CHL, COL, 
CUB, DNK, 
ECU, EGY, FIN, 
GRC, ICH, 
JAV, JPN, 
MEX, NOR, 
NZL, OTT, 
PER, PHL, PRS, 
ROM, SER, SIA, 
SWE, URY, 
VEN 
 
PRT, CHN, 
HKG, IND, 
SGP, ARG, AUS, 
BRA, CAN, 
CEY, CHL, 
COL, CUB, 
DNK, ECU, 
EGY, FIN, GRC, 
ICH, JAV, JPN, 
MEX, NOR, 
NZL, OTT, PER, 
PHL, PRS, 
ROM, SER, SIA, 
SWE, URY, 
VEN 
CHN, 
HKG, IND, 
SGP, ARG, 
AUS, BRA, 
CAN, CEY, 
CHL, COL, 
CUB, ECU, 
EGY, FIN, GRC, 
ICH, JAV, JPN, 
MEX, NZL, 
OTT, PER, 
PHL, PRS, 
ROM, SER, SIA, 
URY, VEN 
ARG, AUS, 
BRA, CAN, 
CEY, CHL, 
COL, CUB, 
ECU, EGY, 
FIN, GRC, 
ICH, JAV, 
MEX, NZL, 
OTT, PER, 
PHL, PRS, 
ROM, SIA, 
SER, URY, 
VEN 
Source: Authors’ computations, compare Table 4. 
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Figure 1. The Economist, January 10 1880. 
 
Source: The Economist, 10 January 1880, p. 41. 
 
 35 
Figure 2. In- and out-degrees in 1900 
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Source: Narrow data base, for sources and definitions see text. 
 
Figure 3. Weighted and un-weighted measures of centrality (1900) 
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Source: See appendix 3, GBR = 100.
 36 
Figure 4. Who quotes whom in 1900 
 
Source: see Appendix 2.  
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Figure 5. A simple model of the international monetary system in 1900 
Source: authors’ computations, for group membership see Table 5. 
